

Japanese expert teaches in Accra

Scoping Study of 8 targeted countries in West Africa



Ms Wakugawa teaching during the course in Accra, Ghana.

As part of on-going technical support to the *Improving response Capacities to Terrorism Project*, Ms Izumi

Wakugawa from Japan took part in the first pilot training course. Of the mentioned project.

She co-developed the module on “women peacekeeping and terrorism” with two researchers from the KAIPTC, and presented it on October, 30th 2018 at the KAIPTC in Accra. Ms Wakugawa brought her rich experience in the subject matter to bear and evaluation from participants indicated they were happy with her delivery and expertise in the field of women, peacekeeping and terrorism.

This further cements existing collaboration between the KAIPTC and Japan.

The project on “Improving Response Capacities to Terrorism in Peacekeeping Theatres in Africa” implemented by the KAIPTC, included field visits to eight (8) countries in West Africa who contribute police, military and gendarmerie's to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa and around the world.

These countries are Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Togo and Guinea. The field visits took place between June and August 2018.

The research sought to find out training gaps in the content of the curricula of pre-deployment training given to their peacekeepers.

The researchers met with officials from the police, and military gendarmerie who were in charge of peacekeeping training in their respective institutions.


Some of the training gaps realized pertained to the lack of :a counter-terrorism module in pre-deployment trainings: information sharing and intelligence in mission areas: knowledge on how to search and detect Improvised Explosive Devices IEDs: Contextual Analysis and Mediation, Negotiation and Hostage Taking.

Furthermore, there was a general call for the improvement in the quality of equipment that African peacekeepers work. The report of the scoping study fed into a Learning Design and Development (LDD) workshop which was held in August.

KEY DATES:

A. IN COUNTRY TRAINING COURSE IN MALI: JANUARY 28- FEBRUARY 1, 2019

B. MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PROJECT: JANUARY -FEBRUARY 2019



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Two Training Courses on Preventing Terrorism in Peacekeeping Theatres organised in Accra and Nigeria

A two week training course on Preventing terrorism in peacekeeping theatres in Africa was piloted at the KAIPTC in Accra, Ghana, from 22nd October to 2nd November, 2018.

The course was also run in Nigeria from 26-30th November at the Martin Luther Agwai International Leadership Peacekeeping Centre, Jaji, Kaduna, Nigeria. In all, the skill-sets of 62 West African peacekeeping trainers (31 each from Accra and Jaji) were enhanced in the two courses organized in Accra and Jaji. Present at the opening ceremony in Accra were the UNDP country director Ms. Gita Welch, first Secretary of the Japan embassy Mr. Yosunori Nakamura and the Deputy Commandant, KAIPTC, Brigadier General Irvine Aryeetey. The course was grouped under five main themes, these included: terrorism in peacekeeping theatres in Africa: Mine



Front row: Mr. Yosunori Nakamura (in suit). On his left is UNDP Country Director Ms Gita Welch, Deputy Commandant Brig.-Gen. I. Aryeetey and Nana Chinuabua. On her left is Dr. Mpondo-Epo from MINUSMA

awareness and Chemical, Biological, radiological and Nuclear weapons: Information Gathering and Intelligence sharing strategies: Legal/strategic Frameworks for Counter Terrorism: Women Peacekeeping and Terrorism as well as Scenario based Training and Exercises. The scenario exercises reinforced important aspects of the gaps in the current content on terrorism training in the various training institutions in the targeted countries. These focused on mine awareness and improvised explosive devices which are frequently used to carry out acts of terror in the mission in Mali.

As part of the course, participants witnessed live simulation exercises by trained peacekeepers on ambush and counter ambush drills, incident scene preservation and mine awareness. Additionally, exercises on detainee handling and forensics allowed participants to understand the protocols used in handling detainees and also the standard operating procedures in preserving evidence at crime scenes. Together, these two training programmes made participants more enlightened about issues of Terrorism in peacekeeping theatres in Africa



A section of the participants in Nigeria listening to a security briefing at the MLAIPKC



Photo Gallery of courses held at KAIPTC and MLAILPKC



A participant makes a contribution at the KAIPTC course



Opening ceremony at the MLAILPKC, Nigeria



Staff with female participants at the MLAILPKC in Nigeria



Opening ceremony at the KAIPTC, Ghana



Participants observing a demonstration on mine awareness in Accra



Counter-ambush drills scenario at the MLAILPKC

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From keeping the peace to protecting peacekeepers: the dilemma of peacekeeping missions in volatile operations

By Afua Lamptey

Peacekeeping operations have grown considerably in size and complexity since the panel on United Nations Peace Operations released its seminal report in 2000. There are currently 14 peace operations with 103, 190 personnel as at October, 2018. This is a significant growth in peacekeeping and a reflection of the changing nature of contemporary conflicts. Increasingly, personnel today operate in vast, fragile countries alongside armed militants and violent extremist groups that have little regard for political commitments or compromise and fewer still for targeting civilians.

Since 1948 when the first peacekeeping mission was deployed in Palestine, 3,780 peacekeepers have lost their lives, out of which 943 were killed by violence. Further, since 2013, there has been a spike in casualties with 195 deaths recorded in volatile areas, making it the highest number of human casualties in any five year period in UN peacekeeping history.

Traditional peacekeeping in the early days of peacekeeping was concerned with creating buffer zones, monitoring cease fires and ensuring both parties to the peace agreements lived up to the outlined provisions. However after the cold war, peacekeeping had to adapt to the changing nature of conflicts resulting in more actors, and

more robust interventions. Today, as the Cruz report on improving the security of UN peacekeepers noted, the blue helmet and the United Nations flag no longer offer ‘natural’ protection. Peacekeeping environments now feature a deadly cocktail of security threats. The evolving nature of the threats faced means that there must be a more proactive approach to peacekeeping.

Increasingly operating under the UN’s Chapter VI provisions puts peacekeepers in a strait-jacket and does not allow them to respond effectively to the changing contexts.

Against the above background, police/troop contributing countries (P/TCCs) have pressed the UN for authorization to respond to terror attacks in equal measure. Nonetheless, the UN’s response has been that of caution – i.e. rather establishing transnational crime and counter-



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terrorism units in the respective theatres. While acknowledging some of the efforts by the P/TCCs to prevent the killing of their peacekeepers in the field, questions remain as to what more P/TCCs can do on their own to prevent mass killings of peacekeepers in international peace support operations. Admittedly, the UN has taken steps to improve the security of United Nations peacekeepers and is currently revising an action plan on the issue, but much remains to be done to improve the current situation.

Peacekeeping fatalities due to acts of violence have targeted more military components with the vast majority of attacks on movements and camps. Currently, the UN missions in Mali, Central African Republic and Congo represent the highest fatalities recorded. While small arms are used in all of these missions, Mali's threats specifically includes Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices – VBIED and Improvised explosive Devices – IEDs as well as indirect fire attacks. Not surprisingly, African peacekeeping troops suffer the highest number of fatalities.

A number of factors accounts for this.

This article draws on information gathered from field research missions as part of project on *Improving re-*



Detainee handling simulation during the course in Jaji

sponse capacities against terrorism in peacekeeping theatres in Africa" supported by the Government of Japan through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), implemented by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) for eight police/troop contributing countries (P/TCCs) in West Africa. During the above-mentioned research missions, KAIPTC researchers including this author conducted interviews with selected peacekeepers and training institutions from eight West African countries between June and August, 2018. The findings have largely informed what follows.

Firstly, many of those interviewed expressed concerns about the nature of the UN's mandate in areas contested by terrorists. The UN doesn't have

a counter-terrorism feature in its training curricular and mandate, hence there was difficulty in interpreting UN mandates on the field especially as relates to terrorism and within the paucity of counter-terrorism training traditionally given by the UN pre-deployment packages. Further, terrorism is usually not adequately covered in pre-

deployment training (PDTs). Therefore, peacekeepers do not always understand the concept, root causes, signs of radicalization and violent extremism and the motivations of terrorists. Further, they are unable to decipher between insurgent attacks and terrorist attacks and its linkages to organized crime, for instance, in a theatre like Mali.

Generally, those deployed for peacekeeping receive conventional training which needs to be augmented with asymmetric warfare skills. This necessitates the need for conceptual clarity



in discussions on peacekeeping and terrorism. In light of the ongoing complexities, the UN needs to take a second look at how terrorists should be dealt with by peacekeepers if the death toll is to be reduced in their missions.

Secondly, the problem of Information/intelligence sharing in the mission areas has been identified as a major challenge to effective terrorism prevention in peace-

counterparts are unwilling to share intelligence with other different contingents hence increasing the risk of peacekeepers to terrorist attacks.

Also critical to this point, is the knowledge-gap in intelligence gathering by many of the African PT/CCs. TCCs. While collaborations with local communities, aid agencies and women and youth groups form a good source for enhancing information/



keeping theatres, especially in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission (MINUSMA).

This has been attributed in part, to the lack of modern hi-tech gadgets such as night goggles, sensors and drone-surveillance equipment among others to detect and pre-empt attacks. As a result, African P/TCCs who are usually ill-equipped suffer more causality compared to Western counterparts such as operation Barkhane. However, the problem of turf-wars and mistrust among the different P/TCCs also compounds the situation even more as different actors operating alongside MINUSMA such as the French, the Americans and other Western

intelligence gathering in peacekeeping theatres, there is also the fear of local communities becoming targets for terrorist attacks. These challenges can be improved by strengthening human intelligence as part of peacekeepers' skills in preventing terrorism in peacekeeping theatres.

Indeed most African TCCs are not able to pre-empt and prevent terrorist attacks and this tends to affect their ability to cope with terror attacks and avoid massive human casualties. Some respondents argue that intelligence training should incorporate skill sets for engaging local communities as well as women peacekeepers who tends to connect better with their counterpart women in local communities.

Additionally, turf-wars and mistrust among P/TCCs also make



information/intelligence sharing in the mission area difficult. Respondents further explained that, usually, troops from more advanced countries/regions have access to modern/ hi-tech gadgets to aid them in intelligence (information) gathering. However, they do not share these information with other contingents. This often exposes ground troops and patrol teams to danger of attacks by terrorist and insurgent groups. An additional bottleneck relates to insufficient skills for searching and detecting IEDs and a lack of equipment for detecting the IEDs. In this regard, knowledge and skills and appropriate equipment in these areas are needed. Exploding IEDs have become a number one source of peacekeeper casualties in MINUSMA over the past six years. The IEDs are usually made in different ways (hand held, simple homemade explosives, radio-controlled IEDs run by cars, in the northern part of Mali. They are exploded often during logistic convoys by contingents moving to various peacekeeping theatres such as Gao, Kidal and Tessalit. Although the local police have some sort of training in IEDs, most of the TCCs have limited knowledge of the peacekeeping environment, as well as training in detecting the IEDs, resulting in increasing troop casualties. Part of the reason is that, detecting IEDs requires technical competence, which can be acquired through well-crafted training programmes.

As a result, and based on the Santa Cruz report, counter IED training has become very critical for troops being deployed to MINUSMA. It is useful to know that the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides such training in the missions. However, these need to be incorporated in pre-deployment training as well.

Moreover, inadequate and sub-standard equipment of, particularly, African contingents, combine to ensure that their safety and security is compromised during logistics convoy. This partly has to do with the UN's policy of Contingents Own Equipment, which means that, the TCCs bring their own equipment based on pre-agreed terms and the UN reimburses later. This allows some TCCs to bring in equipment that is not responsive to the threat in the mission theatre.

In conclusion, the ability of terrorists and terror groups to use countries that host international peacekeeping operations such as Mali to launch attacks on neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and Niger, calls for more attention towards capacity development to prevent more killings of peacekeepers in their line of duty. That way, peacekeepers can also help contain the spread of terrorism in West Africa. As the UN seeks an effective way around the management of terror attacks in peacekeeping theatres, the question remains as to whether or not peacekeepers are well prepared for their assignments prior to their deployment by their respective countries. As the Cruz report again notes, if the UN and the troop and police contributing countries do not change their mindset, take risks and show a willingness to face these challenges, they will be consciously sending troops into harm's way. —end



ELECTIONS AND SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

JM Pokoo & Frank Okyere-Osei

Elections have become the direct means through which political leaders are selected in West Africa. The main sub-regional grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has a zero tolerance policy for power attained or maintained by illegitimate means.

Indeed elections signify power transfers and a conflict litmus test. Recent events in many West African countries demonstrate that



Images from 2015 general elections in Nigeria

elections in 2019 and 2020 could produce unstable outcomes. However, varied conditions prevail in many of the ECOWAS countries.

For example, in Togo, Burkina Faso and to some extent Ghana, electoral politics is laced with the legacy of the tensed era of the decolonization period in which external support produced alternative rival rulers through coup d'-

tats. For such countries, the rivalries between the dislodged elites and the western-inspired military rulers, found its way into the democratic dispensation and governance structures, hence, the impact of elections in changing political leadership, reaches beyond the wishes of the domestic voting population to touching on the strategic calculations of external interests in such countries.

Niger has managed to bridge its internal identity challenges by its shear ability to integrate the Tu-

regs into national governance mechanisms while Guinea remains a highly police State with a lid on critical opposition.

But in Benin, Senegal and once again Ghana, internal tra-

ditions of political rivalry is inspiring a bitter politics of intimidation and quasi-militancy including the use of thugs that threatens the security politics in particular countries.

In Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra-Leone and Mali where recent warfare or a combination of terrorism and insurgency continue to play a remarkable part in



ELECTIONS AND SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA CONT'D

shaping the turnout of political events such as elections, governance unfolds in highly contested jurisdictions.

In **Nigeria**, for example, presidential and legislative elections occur on 16th February, 2019. The object is to elect a President, 360 members of the National Assembly and 109 Senators.

Internally, issues of geo-politics, ethnicity and religion are important in Sub-Saharan Africa's most populous country. But the African continent is waiting to see a revitalized Nigeria to play its hegemonic role in the security politics of Africa.

Two of the leading candidates, sitting President Muhammadu Buhari and former Vice President Atiku Abubakar are not novices to the Presidency. However, they come to the contest with various approaches. While President Buhari enjoys direct grassroots support from the north, north-central and parts of the south-east, his main opponent rides on his network of political elites with significant political capital. In other words, the main contestants seek to reach voters via different methods and therefore, there is every semblance of a tight elections looming.

At the same time, for the voting middle class population whose vote could influence the eventual verdict, lapses at any stage of the electoral process could prove sensitive, especially, their reading of whether or not to blame which candidate for such lapses.

In that regard, three important issues are of importance to voters in Nigeria and to the wider ECOWAS sub-region. The extent to which the two leading candidates have disseminated these issues to their constituents could well determine their performance in the elections:

The first is the recent suspension of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN), Justice Walter Samuel Nkanu Onnoghen. Closer to a highly-contested election, voters become interested in how a contested outcome could be resolved peacefully. The role of the judiciary becomes critical. The suspension of the Chief Justice could be a key source of conflict in the event of any electoral dispute adjudication. Further, the burning down of two election commission offices a few days before the presidential election has raised the temperature of the electoral ecosystem.

Second is the track-record of the two leading candidates on the issue of fighting corruption which is considered the worst enemy of progress in Nigeria. Last but not least, the combined impact of terrorist group, Boko Haram and sporadic farmer-herder clashes in Nigeria (and across West Africa) is

